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TowARD DECONSTRUCTING THE DECONSTRUCTION

OF LAW AND LAWYERS
PENELOPE EILEEN BRYAN*

Lawyers have yet to experience a period of great public approbation.'
Nevertheless, the current offensive against lawyers, litigants, and litigation
seems particularly virulent and widespread. 2 Lack of access to the legal
system frustrates many citizens,3 and professed pundits, liberal and conservative, point to overcrowded dockets as evidence of the system's failure
to provide legal services to both the powerful and the disadvantaged. 4 A
profusion 5 of overly zealous lawyers, 6 discovery abuse, 7 expansion of legal
*

Penelope Eileen Bryan, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of

Law.
1. See, e.g., Honestus (Benjamin Austin), Observationson the PerniciousPractice of the Law,
13 Am.J. LEGAL HisT. 244,249 (1969); Lawrence Savell, Why Are They Picking on Us?, 78 A.B.A.
J., Nov. 1992, at 72, 72; Mark G. Yudof, Lawyers Aren't Really So Bad - And Times They Are AChanging,TEx. LAw.,Jan. 20, 1992, at 12.
2. See generally Robert C. Post, On the PopularImage of the Lawyer Reflections in a Dark
Glass, 75 CAL. L. Rav. 379 (1987).
3. E.g., Charles R. Epp, Do Lawyers ImpairEconomic Growth?, 17 LAw & Soc. INQurmy 585,
621 (1992) (observing that lack of access is occurring at a time when people, more than ever,
need technical legal advice to help them maneuver through complex administrative and
corporate mazes, heightening citizen frustration).
4. See, e.g.,Joel B. Grossman & Austin Sarat, Access to Justice and the Limits of Law, 3 LAW
& PoL'v Q. 125, 127 (1981); William Rich, The Role ofLauvyers: BeyondAdvocay, 1980 B.Y.U. L
REv. 767, 780; Austin Sarat, The LitigationExplosion, Access to Justice, and Court Reform: Examining the CriticalAssumptions, 37 RTrroGEs L. REv. 319, 319-25 (1985).
5. SeeJames Bishop,Jr., Quayle vs. The Lawyers. The Hunt Is onfor a Plump New Scapegoat
to Blame for the Nation's Woes, ARiz. RaEPuuc, Dec. 8, 1991, at C5 (reporting that critics of the
legal system claim that the United States has 20 times more lawyers than Japan per 100,000
population); Saundra Torry, Quayle and Curtin Generate More Heat Than Light in ABA Debate
WAsH. Posr, Aug. 19, 1991, at F5 (quoting Vice President Quayle as stating that America has
70% of the world's lawyers). See infra note 31 for commentators and studies that refute these
claims.
6. Peter Carlson writes: "Standing by, ready and eager to help Americans bludgeon
each other with lawsuits, are nearly 800,000 lawyers...." Peter Carlson, LegalDamages,WASH.
PosT, March 15, 1992, at Wll. Moreover, Robert Sayler quotes William F. Buckley as saying.
"What we have too much of is litigation-but diminish litigation, and you diminish the things
that keep lawyers busy .... The Result is the current litigious mess." Robert N. Sayler, Don't
Blame the Lawyers,WASH. Posr, Sept. 21, 1991, at A21. Mr. Buckley wrote this statement only a
few weeks before he and seven other Yale alumni filed suit in a Connecticut state court seeking to bar women from membership in Yale University's Skull & Bones Society-a secret, allmale club. Id.
7. See Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Laryers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal
Problems and Abuses, 1980 Am. B. Foumn. Ras.J. 787, 811, 833-35 (1980) (reporting that in a
1980 survey of Chicago attorneys, 96% said that they had settled a case knowing significant
information the opposition had not discovered and that evasive or incomplete responses
impeded discovery in 60% of their cases); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Discovery Abuse Revisited: Some
Specific Proposals to Amend the FederalRules of Civil Procedure 26 U.S.F. L. REv. 189,192 (1992)
(designating discovery abuse as a major problem in our courts); Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R King, CurbingDiscovey Abuse in Civil Litigation:Enough is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev.
579, 579-80; Robert E. Sarazen, Note, An EthicalApproach to Discovery Abuse, 4 GEo. J. LEGAL
ETHics 459, 459-60 (1990) (observing that discovery is not achieving its purpose of assuring
"mutual knowledge of all relevant facts" due to various forms of abuse).
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doctrine, s and a litigation-loving populace 9 allegedly cause the overload. 10
The adoption of informal dispute resolution procedures like mediation
and arbitration is urged as a way to alleviate court congestion."
8. SeeJohn H. Barton, Behind theLegalEplosion,27 STAN. L. REv. 567 (1975) (discussing
two explanations given for the expansion of law- the increasing complexity of society and the
perceived helplessness of the individual); Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis, OurNationalDieas 71
Nw. U. L. REv. 767, 767 (1977) (hyperlexis described as a "pathological condition caused by
an overactive law-making gland"); George L Priest, The New Legal Structure ofRisk Contro 119
DAEDALus 207 (1990) [hereinafter Priest, Risk Contro!] (changes in legal doctrine partially
responsible for increase in products liability cases).
9. Chief Justice Warren Burger opined: "One reasbn our courts have become
overburdened is that Americans are increasingly turning to the courts for relief from a range
of personal distresses and anxieties.... The courts have been expected to fill the void created by the decline of church, family, and neighborhood unity." Warren Burger, Isn't There a
Better Way?, 68 A.BA.J. 274, 275 (1982). See also Maurice Rosenberg, Let's Eveiybody Litigate?,
50 TEx. L. REv. 1349, 1350 (1982) (Americans overemphasize litigation, seeing the courts as
the solution to problems once thought of as personal misfortune). Peter Carlson disapprovingly notes that nearly 18 million new civil suits were filed in American courts in 1989-one
for every 10 American adults. Carlson, supra note 6, at W1l. But see Sarat, supra note 4, at
320-21 (the idea of an overly litigious society is largely a problem of perspective).
Studies belie the myth of litigious Americans. See infra note 31. In spite of the legal
profession's growth and the organizational complexity of the United States, many Americans
continue to avoid using lawyers. Epp, supra note 3, at 621.
10. Cf Sarat, supranote 4, at 320 (acknowledging these explanations but critiquing their
foundation). Generally, confusion abounds over where to place the blame for the alleged
litigation explosion. See Saundra Torry & Mark Stencel, Bush, Quayle Put Lawyers in ElectionYearDocke WASH. Posr, Aug. 28, 1992, atA16 (reporting President Bush's statement that the
problem was not lawyers, but a legal system which had "spun out of control" and his very
different statement four months later that the problem was "ambulance-chasing lawyers.").
11. During colonial times, the public sought alternative ways of resolving disputes out of
fear that self-interested lawyers would protect only their own interests. Austin, supra note 1,
at 267-72 (proposing that parties should offer their pleas personally rather than utilizing
lawyers who engage in "lawcraft").
Today informal alternatives to litigation receive broad support. See, e.g., STEPHEN B.
GoLDnRGo Er AL., DisPuTE REsoLrrON 7 (1985); Stephen R. Feldman, A Statutoy Proposal to
Remnove Divorcefrom the Courtroom, 29 ME. L. REv. 25, 33 (1977) (encouraging divorce mediation in order to alleviate court congestion); Nancy Ann Holman & Jane Noland, Agreement
and Arbitration: Relief to Over-Litigation in Domestic Relations Disputes in Washington, 12 WiLurmEr L. REv. 527, 544 (1976); Joshua D. Rosenberg, In Defense of Mediation, 33 Axuz. L.
Rev. 467, 467 (1991) (arguing that mediation empowers the parties, savesjudicial resources,
reduces court overloads, and is more likely to satisfy the parties than is the court process); see
also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Paul D. Scott, The PublicNature of PrivateAdjudication, 6 YALE L
& POL'Y Rev. 42, 42-47, 52-60 (1988) (discussing how access to justice concerns have encouraged the movement to private justice). See generally LEMAL BtxAKDowN: 40 WAYS TO Fix
OUR LEGAL SVSTEM 83-84 (Stephen Elias et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter LEMAL Be eAxOwN]
(neighborhood disputes should always be mediated to avoid entanglement in the court system and its costs). In Colorado the Judicial Department's long-range strategic planning project ("Vision 2020: Colorado Courts of the Future") has uncritically endorsed Frank Sander's
vision of a multi-doored courthouse that offers disputants the choice of various dispute resolution alternatives. The project report, however, does reflect some sensitivity to the special
problems alternative dispute resolution (ADR) presents in family cases. Craig Boersema, Vision 2020: Building a StrategicPlanfor Colorado Courts, 22 COLO. LAw. 11, 16 (1993).
As George Priest notes, however, neither the size of the court system, the composition of
the caseload, the number of judges, the number of cases per judge, the court's settlement
policies, nor the provision of mandatory alternatives demonstrably affect the speed of case
disposition. George L. Priest, PrivateLitigants and the Court CongestionProblem, 69 B.U. L. Rev.
527, 528-29 (1989). Moreover, many commentators have questioned the virtues and have
suggested the negative consequences of ADR. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, The Contradictionsof
InformalJustice, in 1 THE POLITIcS OF INvo A.Jus-nc: THE A. imc, ExPERIENcE 267 (Richard L. Abel, ed., 1982); Edward Brunet, Questioningthe Quality of AlternateDispute Resolution, 62
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The formal system's frequent failure to dispense substantive justice
also promotes public indignation. 12 Academic criticism reinforces public
disdain. Scholars deconstruct the notion of legal rights, suggesting that
rights rarely protect the disadvantaged,' 3 increase alienation, 14 fail to address truly important needs like food and shelter,15 and discourage the
political mobilization of the powerless needed for reform. 16 Others conTn.. L Rxv. 1 (1987); Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: DivorceMediation and the Politics of
Power, 40 BuFF. L. REv. 441 (1992); Sara Cobb &Janet Rifkin, Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing Neutrality in Mediation, 16 LAw & Soc. INQUImY 35 (1991); Richard Delgado et al.,
Fairnessand Formality:Minimizing the Risk ofPr udice in Alternative DisputeResolution, 1985 Wis.
L. Rav. 1359 (1985); Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal
Change in Child Custody'Decisionmaking, 101 HIIv. L. R~v. 727, 729, 774 (1988); Trina Grillo,
The MediationAlternative: ProcessDangersfor Women, 100 YALE LJ. 1545 (1991); RobertJ. Levy,
Comment on the Pearson-ThoennesStudy and on Mediation, 17 F m. L.Q. 525, 525 (1984).
12. Charles Dickens provides a classic example of citizen frustration:
The systeml I am told on all hands, it's the system. I mustn't look to individuals. It's
the system ....
I mustn't go to Mr. Tulkinghorn, the solicitor in Lincoln's Inn
Fields, and say to him when he makes me furious by being so cool and satisfied-as
they all do, for I know they gain by it while I lose, don't I?-I mustn't say to him, "I
will have something out of some one for my ruin, by fair means or foull" He is not
I will
responsible. It's the system. But, if I do no violence to any of them ....
accuse the individual workers of that system against me, face to face, before the
great eternal barl
CHARLES DicERNs, BLEAK HOUSE 228 (Signet 1974) (emphasis removed).
Public outrage in response to the Rodney King verdict affords a more current example.
See, e.g., Bill Maxwell, Blacks Must Give Voice to Values, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, May 27, 1992, at
A9; Cycles ofPoliticalExpediency, HARFORD CoUANT, May 17, 1992, at B2. For statistics on the
public's reaction to the verdict, see Richard Morin, Polls UncoverMuch Common Groundon LA.
Verdic WASH. POST, May 11, 1992, at A15.
13. See, e.g., STUART ScHEINGoLD, THE PoLITICS OF RIG S 6-9 (1974); Michael Diamond,
Law, the Problems of Poverty, and the 'Myth of Rights,'1980 B.Y.U. L. REv. 785 (discussing the
failure to provide housing for low-income citizens despite favorable legislation); Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves"Come out Ahead: Speculationson the Limits ofLegal Change,9 LAw & Soc',
REv. 95, 103-04 (1974) [hereinafter Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead] (noting that
those who are unfamiliar with the legal system and have limited access to legal services are
disadvantaged by legal institutions and rules).
Members of the Critical Legal Studies Movement see little value in rights due to their
indeterminate nature. See Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology ofRights-Consciousnessand the Pactof
the Withdrawn Selves, 62 Tax. L. REv. 1563, 1584-85 (1984) (rights possess an "infinite number
of surface meanings" that protect their "fantastic nature" and obstruct the desire to give them
a realized meaning); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BuFF. L.
Rv. 209, 359-60 (1979) (a conflict between rights forces a choice between categorizations
that a skillful arguer can manipulate); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tax. L. Rav.
1363, 1364 (1984) (rights matter only when recognized in a specific social setting).
14. See Gabel, supranote 13, at 1567-76 (asserting that alienation occurs when people
who desire authentic contact with each other assume the character of "rights-bearing
citizens").
15. See Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll OverBeethoven, 36 STAN. L. Rav. 1, 33 (1984)
(arguing that people do not need rights, but rather forms of social life created through the
building of movements).
16. See, e.g., Richard D. Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIo
ST. L.J. 223, 240-52 (1981); Louis B. Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest C_,SLand, 36 STAN. L. Rav. 413, 424-26 (1984).
Professor Derrick Bell has hinted at the political immobilization that occurs when rights
generate a false sense of security
One of the most insidious aspects of our civil rights policies is the false sense of
racial neutrality that they provide. This mirage is so attractively pervasive, even
some of the best young black minds are fooled into believing that they made it
strictly on merit, and that affirmative action and other preferential policies deny
them the credit and respect that they deserve.
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firm what the public experiences and scholars surmise-the formal system's failure in many contexts17 to deliver the substantive justice it
promises.18

Courts themselves often invite public scorn by treating certain disputants with disrespect. 19 Lawyers, concerned with the economics of prac20
tice, sometimes do not provide the care and concern their clients seek.
The problem is that the new civil rights laws permit discrimination even as they
outlaw it, and they make policies and actions that are non-discriminatory seem like
mandated compliance, when, in fact, they are voluntary responses to self-interest
and profit.
Stephanie B. Goldberg, Who'KAfraid of DerrickBell? A Conversation on Harvard,Storytelling and
the Meaning of Color, 78 A.B.A. J. 56, 57 (1992); see also Linda Greenhouse, Ginsburg a Rare
JudicialFind: Though a Liberat Nominee Favors Restraintby the Courts, DENy. POST, July 25, 1993,
at 6A (explaining that Ginsburg thought that the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Roe v. Wade encouraged members of the abortion-rights movement to relax).
17. For example, Mark Tushnet argues that by stripping the states of power to control
women's abortion decisions in Roe v. Wade the Supreme Court also created a foundation
which allowed it later to find no state obligation to provide funding for abortions. Mark V.
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96
HARv. L. RExv. 781, 813-14 (1983). What the Court gave to the privileged with one hand it
took from the disadvantaged with the other.
18. The pluralism of our society inevitably compromises our legal system's ability to produce results that a broad spectrum of our citizens will perceive as just. See generally ROBERTO
M. UNGER, LAw IN MODERN SOCIETY: TowARD A CRTcIsM OF SocLAL THEORY 198-200 (1976).
See also Harry T. Reis, The Multidimensionality ofJustice, in THE SENSE OF INJUsTIcE: SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERsPEcrvEs 38-57 (Robert Folger ed., 1984) (suggesting that individual
characteristics such as gender, belief in the Protestant Ethic, and belief in the legitimacy of
various distributional schemes influence perceptions of substantive justice).
19. E.g., Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator,Representation as Text: Towards
an Ethnography ofLegal Discourse, 77 CORNE.LL L. REv. 1298, 1313 (1992) (reporting that the
judge in an "attitude arrest" case paid little attention to defendant's testimony, turning his
chair away from the witness stand so he could not see the defendant); Linda K. Girdner,
Adjudication and Mediation:A Comparison of Custody Decision-Making Processes Involving Third
Parties,8J. DIVORCE,. Spring/Summer 1985, at 33, 37-38 (quoting an exasperated family law
judge as telling the parties, "I never understand why parents want to spend all their money
on lawyers' fees for somethingbetween themselves... You two are probably going to fight on and

on.... It's utterly ridiculous.") (alteration in original).
As one report indicates:
One Texas judge justified giving a light sentence to a convicted killer because the
victim had been gay. Many commentators criticized the judge's candor, but not his
prejudice.

Judges often treat minority and women witnesses, court employees and lawyers without respect. For example, one California judge ordered an attorney-the only woman among a group of seven-to type up a settlement agreement. "Come on
sweetheart," urged the judge. "I know you can type." African-American and Hispanic lawyers are often harassed by court officers who assume they are criminal
defendants. Judges often call them by their first names and refer to their minority
clients as "boy" or "girl."

Such prejudice also destroys faith in the fairness of the court system. A 1989 New
York investigation into racial bias found that many minorities mistrust the state's
court system, which is overwhelmingly dominated by whites....
But despite the mounting evidence, most courts refuse even to acknowledge
the problem. This hypocrisy and indifference, on top of the actual unfairness,
make a travesty of the legal system's claims to provide equal justice under the law.
LEGAL BRAiwowN, supranote 11, at 43-44; see also KAREN CzAPANsvY & TmcIA D. O'NEIL.L,
THE WOMEN's BAR Ass'N OF MARYLAND, COURTWATCH REPORT 24-28 (1993).

20. From his hundreds of interviews with clients, Alan Levine concluded that clients
value lawyers who, among other things, listen and treat them with respect. Alan P. Levine,
Lookingfor Mr. Goodlayer.What Clients Want A.B.A.J., Sept. 1992, at 60, 60-62. He also noted
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Further, the public grows increasingly uneasy with the law's steady encroachment into areas once thought private21 and with the perceived gap
22
between substantive law and individual mores.
Faulty system operation and public resentment are not the only
problems allegedly flowing from a surplus of lawyers and Americans'
penchant for litigation. President Bush blamed ambulance-chasing lawyers for the reluctance of doctors to practice in rural areas and for the
unwillingness of parents to coach Little League. 23 Increased malpractice
premiums allegedly price medical care beyond the reach of most citizens
and drive doctors from their profession. 2 4 The Bush Administration
claimed that the litigation explosion bleeds our economy of $80 billion in
that it is the rare lawyer who takes sufficient time to listen and understand client problems
and concerns. Id. at 62; see also Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling Reappraisal
and Refinemen4 32 ARIz. L. REV. 501, 506 (1990) (stating that in traditional legal counseling,
the lawyer is concerned with the client's reaction to his advice but tends not to value client
input and that the lawyer and client are likely to talk at, rather than with, each other); Suzanne B. O'Neill & Catherine G. Sparkman, What Your Client Expects From You: A Guidefor New
Lawyers, 36 PRAc. LAw., March 1990, at 39, 40 (noting that a frequently heard client complaint is that the lawyer failed to understand what the client needed in the first place, because
the lawyer simply assumed she knew what the client wanted and failed to listen to the client's
actual goal or problem).
In dissolution of marriage cases, the problem seems particularly acute. In their longterm study of divorce lawyers and their clients, Felstiner and Sarat found that lawyers continually encouraged clients to separate emotional from legal issues, while clients could not accept definitions of their cases that excluded emotional issues. William L.F. Felstiner & Austin
Sarat, Enactments of Power:.Negotiating Reality and Respansility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77
CoRmuL L Rav. 1447, 1455 (1992); see alsoJohn Griffiths, What Do Dutch Lawyers Actually Do
in Divorce Cases?, 20 LAw & Soc'v Rav. 135, 152 (1986) (a survey of Dutch divorce clients
revealed that clients often wanted to unburden themselves of emotional and social concerns,
but that lawyers typically reacted to client overtures by offering a cup of coffee or by changing
the subject).
21. Yudof observes that "[o]ur society's frustration with the legal system may result from
the increasing involvement of lawyers with everyday decisions that used to be made by physicians, manufacturers, employers, teachers and police officers." Yudof, supra note 1, at 14; see
also Hazard & Scott, supra note 11, at 52-60 (discussing how the growing public sentiment
that the state should not interfere in voluntary arrangements has influenced the movement
to private justice).
22. Rich, supranote 4, at 783; Lynne D. Wardle, The Gap Between Law and Moral Order:An
Examination of the Legitimacy of the Supreme Court Abortion Decisions, 1980 B.Y.U. L. Ray. 811,
811. To some extent, this gap exists because of the growing complexity and the pluralistic
nature of our society. See Diamond, supra note 13, at 792-93; Richard D. Schwartz, Law,
Society, and Moral Order:Introduction to the Symposium, 1980 B.Y.U. L Rav. 721, 727-33; see also
UNGER, supranote 18, at 66-86 (arguing that the confluence of group pluralism and a belief
in higher law, reinforced by a transcendent religion, produced the rule of law ideal in modem European societies).
23. Torry & Stencel, supra note 10, at A16.
24. Amy Goldstein & Rene Sanchez, D.C. Council at Last Faces MalpracticeMorass, WAsH.
POSr, Feb. 5, 1992, at Cl. However, the reporters also explain that doctors and hospital
officials remain unable to trace rising medical costs to malpractice liability or to offer firm
figures on how many doctors have altered or left their practices in response to increasing
insurance costs. Id. Others note that changes in technology, waste within the medical system, inappropriate treatment, administrative expenses, high doctor incomes, health insurance plans allowing insured individuals to participate in a treatment plan with little out-ofpocket expense, and ignorance and greed probably have more to do with the high cost of
medical care than malpractice liability. Spencer Rich, DemandforHigh-Tech Medicine Hampers
Efforts to CurtailHealth Costs, WAsH. POSr, July 12, 1992, at Al. The first two factors alone
explain 50 to 83% of the increase in medical costs. Id
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direct, and $300 billion in indirect, costs each year. 25 And, Professor
George Priest informs us that in the products liability area substantive doctrine has expanded and liability policy has shifted to risk control. 26 These
developments, he argues, cause American manufacturers to incur more
liability27 and process costs than manufacturers in other countries, hindering our ability to compete in international markets.28 Moreover, anticipation of potential liability provides a disincentive for the creative
development of innovative products2 9-another competitive disadvantage.3 0 In difficult economic times, many Americans find these assertions
25. Carlson, supra note 6, at W15 (quoting then Vice President Quayle).
Professor Galanter, however, identifies two flaws in these figures: (1) costs and transfers
are conflated and (2) benefits are not used to offset costs. Marc Galanter, Too Many Lawyers?
Too Much Law?, 71 DENv. L. REv. 77, 88 (1993).
26. Priest, Risk Control supranote 8, at 207. Priest explains that two assumptions underlie this shift. First, if practical prevention of the injury were possible, liability should extend
to the party in the better position to prevent the injury. Id. at 216. Second, if practical
prevention of the injury were not possible, liability should extend to the party in the better
position to spread the risks of injury. Id. at 216-17. For Priest's explanation of how this shift
occurred, see George L Priest, Strict ProductsLiability: The OriginalInten, 10 CaDozo L REv.
2301, 2302 (1989).
27. Some commentators insist that part of the increased liability stems from jury bias
against business. Yet, a recent study ofjurors reveals that jurors admit skepticism of plaintiff
tort claims against businesses; admit a greater focus on plaintiff actions and motivations than
on businesses' responsibilities; and admit concern over the litigation crisis and the need to
limit awards. Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors'Judgmentsof Business Liability in
Tort Cases: Implicationsfor the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 LAw & Soc'v Rev. 85 (1992).
28. Professor Priest receives support from ex-Vice President Quayle who stated that
America is in the "midst of a 'litigation explosion'.... The result is a civil court system
characterized by 'overloaded court dockets' and 'excessive delay,' a system that.., puts
American business at 'a self-inflicted competitive disadvantage.'" Carlson, supra note 6, at
W15 (paraphrasing Vice President Quayle); see also, e.g., Bishop, supra note 5, at C5.
A recent study by Charles Epp refutes the common assumption that large lawyer populations impair economic growth, claiming it lacks theoretical and empirical support. Epp,
supra note 3, at 585; see also Frank B. Cross, The Fust Thing We Do, Let's Kill All the Economists:
An EmpiricalEvaluationof the Effect of Lawyers on the United States Economy and PoliticalSystem, 70
Tax. L. Rev. 645 (1992) [hereinafter Cross, Effect ofLawyers] (finding no statistically significant
evidence that lawyers impair economic growth). Moreover, risk managers and chief executive officers differ among themselves as to whether litigation affects competitiveness. Galanter, supra note 25, at 81.
Priest also explains that when a firm cannot pass along the increased cost of its liability
insurance premium to consumers because buyers will refuse to purchase at the higher price,
the firm removes the product from the market. He notes a recent survey showing 25% of the
nation's 500 largest corporations had removed products from the market for this reason.
George L. Priest, Puzzles of the Tort Crisis, 48 Osno ST. L.J. 497,500 (1987). Perhaps, however,
removing products from the market when cbnsumers are unwilling to pay the full cost of
producing them, including the cost of injury, is a social good rather than an economic evil.
29. Priest, Risk Contro supra note 8, at 223 (noting that since 1987, 25% of U.S. manufacturers have discontinued new product research for liability reasons).
30. Priest's position implies an unacknowledged value preference for maximum economic prosperity over increased consumer safety. Priest, however, also suggested during his
oral comments that increased tort liability hurts disadvantaged people because it causes firms
to remove cheaper products that the poor people want from the market or to raise the price
of these products beyond the poor's ability to purchase. He also explained that forcing manufacturers to insure for an average expected liability payout for a particular product resulted
in the poor, in essence, subsidizing the insurance costs of high-income earners and the
wealthy because their tort damages normally were considerably greater than those of the
poor. For fuller development of this argument, see id. at 225-26.
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threatening, increasing their disapproval of lawyers, litigants, and litigation in general.
These criticisms decrease the legitimacy of the legal system, tarnish
the reputation of the legal profession, and discourage the public from
bringing legal claims. If these accusations were valid, or if they told the
entire story, our justice system would need sweeping reform and citizens
would be wise to seek alternatives to legal representation. Yet, Professor
Galanter and others have demonstrated that distorted and erroneous statistics provide the only support for most of these criticisms.31 Moreover,
discussions about the legal system and how to restructure the delivery of
legal services appear one-sided, largely ignoring the system's positive attributes and what might be worth retaining or supporting. What promotes
this shortsightedness and distortion? In seeking an answer, I first want to
expand the discourse on the formal legal system by acknowledging its positive attributes, by transforming the pejorative language used to describe
lawyers and litigants, and by discussing unacknowledged problems and potential solutions.
To begin, I agree with critics that talented and dedicated (rather than
overly zealous) lawyers successfully have pushed for the expansion of substantive doctrine in many areas. The development of strict liability for defective products makes successful claims against manufacturers easier.
The redefinition of marital property in family law gives divorcing wives
rights to more of the marital assets. 3 2 Similarly, prior to the last two Republican administrations, the expansion of civil rights doctrine offered minorities and women greater redress for injuries.as In each of these areas,
reform led by dedicated lawyers has helped the traditionally dis-

31. For instance, commentators claim that American lawyers comprise 70% of the
world's total of lawyers. Carlson, supra note 6, at W1l. Yet, American lawyers (including
judges, prosecutors, government lawyers, and in-house corporate counsel) only comprise between 25 and 30% of the world's lawyers. Galanter, supra note 25, at 108. Galanter also
indicates that countries with the highest lawyer populations do not suffer impaired economic
growth. Id. at 81. For additional statistical misrepresentations, I refer the reader to Galanter's article. Id See also Cross, Effect of Lawyers, supranote 28, at 645; Epp, supranote 3, at
585. Galanter and others also dispute the perception that the American public is overly
litigious. Marc Galanter, The Day After the LitigationExplosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3 (1986); Marc
Galanter, Readingthe Landscape ofDisputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know)
About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 U.C.LA. L. Rev. 4 (1983) [hereinafter
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes];Earl Johnson, Jr. & Ann Barthelms Drew, This
Nation Has Moneyfor EvaythingExcept Its Courts, 17JuvmcEsJ. 8 (1978); Laura Nader, A Litigious
People?, 22 LAw & Soc'y REv. 1017 (1988).
32. E.g., Bryan, supranote 11, at 441, 442 & n.2.
33. But see GERALD N. RosFNBFRG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN CoURTs BRING ABoUT SocIAL
CHANGE? (1991) (arguing that courts by themselves largely are ineffective at bringing about
meaningful social change). See Michael W. McCann, Reform Litigation on Tia4 17 Lw &
SoC. INQunty 715 (1993) for a review and critique of Rosenberg's analysis. See also Kimberle
William Crenshaw, Race Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HI-tv. L REv. 1331 (1988) (arguing that those who have not known the
reality of oppression nor experienced its overpowering constraints cannot understand or
evaluate accurately the civil rights movement).
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empowered. These changes have occurred despite overcrowded
34
dockets.
Moreover, while Professor Galanter is correct in that some characteristics of the legal system impede legal rights from trickling down to the
people they were designed to protect,3 5 that the value of rights is not limited to the results achieved within the formal system. For example, the
social validation implicit in the acquisition of legal rights can instill in recipients a sense of entitlement and dignity and can ultimately affect their
expectations and the confidence with which they act.3 6 Moreover, to the
extent law shapes social attitudes, citizens treat individuals with legal rights
(especially if they have the power to assert them) with more respect than
those who lack the symbolic value the possession of the rights communicates.3 7 The confluence of internal and external validation makes it more
38
likely that a person will take offense at injury and seek redress.
34. Overcrowded dockets hurt the economically disadvantaged who cannot survive long
waits for relief. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead, supra note 13, at 119-22
(arguing that overload increases the cost and risk of adjudicating, tending to favor the already influential); see also Irving R. Kaufman, New Remedies for the Next Centuy ofJudicialReform: Time as the Greatest Innovator,57 FoRDHAN L. Ray. 253, 254-55 (1988) (noting that the
"twin demons" of cost and delay continue to afflict the judicial system, erecting a barrier to
court access).
35. Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead, supranote 13, at 95.
36. In August Wilson's play, Two TrainsRunning a black man named Memphis Lee owns
a small restaurant. The City of Pittsburgh wants to exercise its eminent domain power to
condemn and purchase the restaurant. Memphis engages in negotiations with the city that
come to a favorable conclusion. With a reinforced sense of worth and stature, he talks next
of returning to Alabama to establish his ownership of land illegally taken long ago from his
father. Memphis might be unsuccessful, but his first experience with the law motivates him
to proceed with the second claim. AUGUST WILSON, Two TRsS RUNNING (1992).
37. For a discussion of how the adoption and transformation of standard legal texts by
the disadvantaged can alter mainstream consciousness see Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the
Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies and Reparations,22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 323, 323-35 (1987). See
also Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities
Want?, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 301 (1987); PatriciaJ. Williams, AlchemicalNotes: Reconstructing Idealsfrom Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L L REV. 401 (1987).
38. As noted by Professor Matsuda in discussing Japanese-Americans' struggle against
racism:
If trust in the Constitution sustainsJapanese-Americans in their uphill battle against
racist oppression, then the Constitution for them has become a radical document.
Their consciousness-legal consciousness, if you will-of the ultimate legitimacy of
their fight against racism allows them to hold unpopular and ultimately transformative opinions with confidence, and to risk retribution from powerful opponents.
Matsuda, supra note 37, at 340.41.
Other critical race theorists explain that the impact of rights on those who traditionally
have gone without is different than for those whose power guarantees their advantaged social
positions. See Delgado, supra note 37, at 305-06; Williams, supra note 37, at 404-05; see also
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXcLusio , AND AMERicAN LAW

310 (1990) ("Rights pronounced by courts become possessions of the dispossessed.... Legal
language, like a song, can be hummed by someone who did not write it and changed by
those for whom it was not intended.").

Professors Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat note that class, education, work situations, and social networks contribute to whether, and how quickly, an individual will recognize an experience as an injury, blame someone other than herself for inflicting the injury, and make a
claim for redress of the harm. William L.F. Felstiner, et al., The Emergence and Transformationof
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming.... 15 LAw & Soc'v REv. 631, 632-37, 640 (1980-81); see
also Linda R. Singer, NonjudicialDisputeResolution Mechanisms: The Effects onJusticefor the Poor,

1993]

TOWARD DECONSTRUCT1NG

Additionally, when people expect the formal legal system to recognize
certain rights, the system's failure to do so can produce outrage and meaningful social change may follow.8 9 The insurrection in Los Angeles follow-

ing the Rodney King verdict suggests this possibility.40 Finally, sometimes
the disadvantaged effectively can use the formal legal system to secure
their rights. 4 1 Missing from the discourse that explores the legal system's

value, then, is any recognition of its ability to expand rights for the disadvantaged in a society that allegedly reveres equality and justice for all.
In the civil rights arena, minority protection has eroded under the
42
last two Republican administrations and a reactionary Supreme Court.
13 CLEATnNHOUSE REv. 569, 573 (1979) (noting studies which reveal that minority and low
socioeconomic status negatively influence the propensity to complain about injury).
39. ScsaNaoLD, supra note 13, at 131 (arguing that the sense of entitlement associated

with rights can help initiate and nurture political mobilization).
Many citizens, for instance, called for reform after the Rodney King verdict. See, e.g.,
Melanie E. Lomax, Race, Politics and the System: Cary out Much-needed Reforms Now, ATLANTAJ.
& CONST., May 6, 1992, at A15.
40. But see Kimberle Crenshaw & Gary Peller, Reel Time/RealJustice, 70 DENY. U. L. REy.

283 (1993) (discussing how dominant discourse employs the pejorative narratives of "irrationality" and "deviation from the rule of law" to delegitimate social protest-ultimately reinterpreting insurrection as riot).
41. See Matsuda, supra note 37, at 332-39 for a discussion of how minorities have used
legal doctrine in their fight against racism. While remaining skeptical about law's ability to
effect change, Professor Diamond acknowledges, "[tihe legitimization by the law of new
norms, the recognition of personal 'rights,' provides a basis around which people can organize so that the legal abstractions may be achieved, at least in part" Diamond, supra note 13,
at 794-95. See also ROSENBERG, supra note 33 (setting forth conditions which the author considers necessary, hut rare, before courts can effect significant social change). Professor Galanter notes that rule-changes that redistribute symbolic rewards may make use of the courts
more attractive to have-nots. Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead, supranote 13, at 137.
He also observes, however, that symbolic do not always lead to tangible rewards and that
symbolic rewards may decrease the drive to secure tangible benefits. Id.
Sally Merry's research supports the above legal theorists. She found that courts fre-

quently deny working-class individuals enforcement of their legal entitlements, defining their
problems as moral or therapeutic rather than legal. SALLY ENGLE MElon', Gs-rrNG JUs'ncE
AND Grrnto EvEN 180 (1990). She also observes, however, that working-class court users

frequently resist:
Yet, there are forms of resistance. Even within this relationship of domination,

JdL

plaintiffs struggle to control their problems, to shape the legal system to their needs
rather than to be shaped by it. Despite the efforts of lower-court personnel to convert these legal claims to moral discourse and to send them out the door, plaintiffs
struggle to keep the legal issues in the forefront, to assert their claims for protection
of their rights. Plaintiffs come back, renewing their demands, learning to use legal
categories with more sophistication, mastering legal discourse, asserting their
problems in their full complexity and emotional power, demanding recognition in
their own terms. This is a continuing struggle, a pull between plaintiffs who wish to
harness the power of the law for their own ends and those who would use it to
control the weaker and subordinate members of society.

42. In a recent blow to civil rights litigants, the United States Supreme Court placed the
burden of persuasion on the plaintiff in a wrongful dismissal action to show that the employer gave false -reasons for firing the plaintiff and to show that the actual reason for the
firing was racially motivated. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2748-49
(1993). In his dissentJustice Souter wrote: "[A] victim.., lacking direct evidence will now be
saddled with the tremendous disadvantage of having to confront, not the defined task of
proving the employer's reasons to be false, but the amorphous requirement of disproving all
possible nondiscriminatory reasons that a factfinder might find lurking in the record." Id. at
2762 (Souter, J., dissenting). Public protest was immediate. Overburdened The Supreme Court
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Knowing the political and legal opposition they face, concerned advocates
and courageous clients nevertheless voice their complaints and bring their
formal claims in the legal system.43 Although their activity may not meet
with success for the individual claimant, it keeps the public apprised of
significant social grievances. Moreover, highly visible verdicts from the
formal legal system, like the verdict in the Rodney King case, expose the
hegemony of racism in this country and promote agonizing moral dialogue and intellectual debate. 44 Missing, then, from disparaging discussions of the legal system is acknowledgment of yet another positive
45
attribute: the facilitation of moral discourse on important social issues.
Without dedicated civil rights advocates, we, as citizens, might be more
easily persuaded that our moral problem is solved and that we no longer
46
need be concerned about racism in our society.
In addition to ignoring positive attributes of the formal system, the
critical discourse disregards several serious problems and potential solutions. For instance, as a faculty supervisor in the University of Denver's
poverty clinic, I am convinced our system needs more lawyers. 47 Or, if we
Has Made It Too Difficult to Prove Bias. The Congres Must Ac, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), July 1, 1993, at
54.
43. For instance, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct 2077, 2081 (1991),
an African American sued his employer for injuries he sustained on the job. During voir dire
the employer used two of its three peremptory challenges to remove African Americans from
the perspective jury. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's
refusal to require the employer to articulate a race-neutral reason for the strikes. Later,
however, a divided en banc panel affirmed the district court. Id. Finally, the Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals and remanded to the district court to determine whether a
"prima facie case of racial discrimination has been established.., requiring Leesville to offer
race-neutral explanations for its peremptory challenges." Id. at 2088-89. Edmonson fought
his way through four major judicial proceedings to establish the precedent that civil litigants
are entitled to the same racially neutral juror select:on process as criminal defendants. Edmonson's individual claim against his employer, however, still remained unsolved. Thus,
dedication and perseverance seem required of both the lawyer and the client who are concerned with civil rights.
44. See, e.g., Crenshaw & Peller, supra note 40; Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Notes From
California:Rodney King and the Race Question, 70 DENV. U. L. REv. 199 (1993); Deborah W.
Post, Race, Riots and the Rule of Law, 70 DEN,. U. L. REv. 237 (1993).
45. The high ethical precepts sometimes articulated in law also help maintain the tension between the ideal and the actual, which is a precondition of a community's moral
growth. UNGER, supra note 18, at 216.
The relation of law to morality has received the attention of many scholars. See, e.g.,
RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); LON L FULLER, THE MORALrrv OF LAW
(rev. ed. 1969); JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JusTICE (1972); PHILP SOPER, A THEORY OF LAw

101-09 (1984); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fulelity to Law: A Reply to ProfessorHart, 71 HARv. L.
REv. 630 (1958); H.L.A Hart, Positivism and the Separationof Law and Morals, 71 HA~v. L. Rev.
593 (1958); Schwartz, supra note 22.
46. The increase in hate crimes across our country suggests our continued racism and
our need for constructive moral dialogue. See Dan Lovely, We Came Herefor Freedom... We
Live in Hell, USA WEEKEND: DENv. Posr, Jan. 10, 1993, at 4, 5 (citing statistics reported by
Richard Vega: during 1992 seven percent of adults were hate crime victims and racially motivated crimes increased by 22% in Los Angeles between 1990 and 1991).
47. Laura Nader also notes substantial evidence that, in proportion to population and
need, litigation in the United States is not great. Laura Nader, The RecurrentDialectic Between
Legality and Its Alternatives: The Limitations of Binay Thinking, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 621, 635-36
(1984) (reviewing JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JuSTIcE wrrnotrr LAW (1983)). Statistics show, for
instance, that households use a third party to handle a complaint in only 1.2% of cases where
consumers have problems with purchases. Id. at 635 n.77.
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do have a surplus of lawyers, they seem to work for all the wrong (or perhaps all the same) people. 48 Expansion of legal aid services, government
funding for law school staffed poverty clinics, or national insurance for
legal representation might alleviate this problem. The deficit in or misallocation of legal services and potential solutions, however, receive scant, if
any, consideration.
Overcrowded dockets certainly present problems, particularly in urban areas49 and especially for the economically disadvantaged who cannot
survive a long wait for relief. The creation of more courts, or specialized
courts with highly trained support staff, might mitigate this difficulty.50
Yet these potential solutions remain outside the discourse.
An increase in poverty lawyers and in courts might, however, create a
corresponding increase in substantive legal doctrine sensitive to the interests of the disadvantaged and the injured, compromising the interests of
the privileged. So, too, might litigation that expands the rights of the disadvantaged and exposes and encourages moral debate on significant social problems. A consistent, yet all too familiar, theme emerges. The
current assessment of the formal legal system's viability selectively omits
positive attributes and potential adjustments that threaten the powerful.
Consider the following question. If you were worried about (1) the
troublesome redistribution of wealth from the powerful to the disadvantaged that can occur when lawyers advocate in the formal system; (2) the
expansion of substantive law offering greater sensitivity to the rights of and
injuries suffered by the underprivileged; (3) the growing sense of entitlement and dignity of the traditionally disempowered; (4) the continuation
of moral discourse on social issues you did not want acknowledged; and
Similarly a significant body of research shows that the vast majority of negligently injured
people who legally are entitled to compensation receive none at all. Epp, supra note 3, at
591. For instance:
[R]esearch on medical malpractice consistently finds that very small percentages (in
the range of 5-15%) of negligently injured patients, even those suffering from significant permanent injuries, attempt to gain compensation. According to other
studies, there are similarly low claiming rates for various other types of injuries. In a
compelling survey of such evidence, Saks notes: "One of the most remarkable features of the tort system is how few plaintiffs there are."
Id. at 591-92 (footnotes omitted).
48.

See BARBARA A. CURREN & CLARA N. CARSON, SUPPLEMENT TO THE LA,%ER STATISTICAL

REPORT 20 (1988) (indicating that of the 723,189 lawyers in the United States in 1988, only
7,369 or 1% of them were employed as legal aid attorneys or public defenders, while 519,941
or 71.9% were in private practice and 66,627 or 9.2% worked for private industry).
Interestingly, the 250,000 to 300,000 lawyers in the Soviet Union in 1990 offered private
citizens little relief because representation normally went to state enterprises, foreign businesses, and organized crime. David Lempert, Russians Still Can't Get MuchJustice N.Y. TIMES,
June 5, 1992, at A28.
49. Dockets are more crowded in urban areas. See Catherine T. Clarke, Missed Manners
in CourtroomDecorum, 50 MD. L REV. 945,948 n.7 (1991) (noting that urban dockets are more
crowded); see also Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, PretrialDetention and Punishment, 75
Mim. L. REV. 335, 345 n.70 (1990) (noting that in urban jurisdictions, the criminal justice
systems are often overburdened).
50. Others in the past have suggested these solutions, e.g., James Willard Hurst, The
Functions of Courtsin the UnitedStates, 1950-1980, 15 Lw & Soc'y REv. 401,413 (1980-81), but
recent discussion contains little or no mention of these possibilities. See also Hazard & Scott,
supra note 11, at 47-52 (discussing potential difficulties with specialized tribunals).
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(5) the occasional suggestion that more lawyers and more courts are
needed to address disputants' grievances-what would you do? How
would you reign in troublesome grievants and their even more troublesome lawyers? A number of things might occur to you.
To control grievants, especially the disadvantaged, you might launch
a negative publicity campaign that distorts statistics and constrains reality.
To convince poor, minority and/or injured persons that legal remedies
should be avoided, you might decry the litigiousness of the American public, making them appropriately ashamed if they dared to litigate their disputes. Japanese citizens who seek conciliation rather than litigation could
be offered as desirable models. 51 In essence, you might strive to create an
ideology of conciliation rather than confrontation-of compromise rather
than rights.
Against overly zealous and misdirected lawyers a similar campaign
could be mounted. Those fulfilling the traditional role of advocate would
suffer professional ostracism and stigmatization as greedy and insensitive
undesirables. Your new script for lawyers might proclaim that only "bad"
lawyers pursue client interests and fight for what they believe is right and
fair. 52 "Good" lawyers compromise or "cool out" complaining clients. Aggressive use of Rule 11 sanctions might provide an additional disincentive
53
for creative and expansionist lawyering.
To further protect the interests of the powerful and retard evolution
of substantive doctrines, your publicity campaign might focus on specific
legal areas where the interests of elites seem most threatened. For instance, you might carefully craft arguments and compile statistics designed
to instill fear in the public that the expansion of legal rights in the products liability area threatens the economy and, ultimately, the jobs of those
working for besieged manufacturers. In the family law area where the economic interests of powerful divorcing husbands are under siege, you
might label mothers who litigate as greedy and insensitive to the psychological and emotional harm litigation causes their children. Discouraging
litigation in these and other targeted areas would retard the expansion of
substantive law favoring the less powerful.
51. As Professor Galanter notes, Japan often is offered as a counterpoint to litigious
America. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes, supra note 31, at 11. He also comments,
however, that the much cited Japanese preference for conciliation might result as much from
structural barriers to litigation as from disputant preference. Id. at 58-59.
52. William Rich writes: "Many a couple reconciled to separation has been driven to
hostility by the maximum demands asserted by their spouse's lawyer." Rich, supra note 4, at
782.
53. For a thoughtful appraisal of how Rule 11 sanctions negatively affect civil rights litigation, see Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation,37 BuFr. L REa. 485 (1989); see also
Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A CriticalAnalysis, 118 F.R.D. 189 (1988) (suggesting Rule 11
sanctions disproportionately and negatively affect plaintiffs-especially plaintiffi in civil
rights, employment discrimination, and other types of "disfavored" litigation); Georgene M.
L Ray. 475 (1991) (discussVairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60 FoanRDH
ing the chilling effect of Rule 11 sanctions on various types of plaintiffs and the rule's propensity to increase, rather than decrease, litigation); Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to
the Value ofAccessible CourtsforMinorities,25 HARv.C.R-C.L L.Ray. 341 (1990) (discussing the
effect of Rule 11 sanctions on civil rights litigation).
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To address the threatening solution of more courts and lawyers, and
to further retard legal reform, you might also propose informal alternatives for resolving disputes. These procedures could be offered for cases
that are believed to cause court congestion, thereby reducing the pressure
and temptation to establish more courts. For example, petitions for disso54
lution of marriage constitute a large percentage of filed cases.
Mediators could help divorcing couples resolve their differences, significantly reducing judicial caseloads. Lawyers then would become unnecessary and unwelcome participants in divorce dispute resolution, alleviating
any perceived need for more lawyers. Ordering large numbers of disputes
into informal procedures where legal rights lack relevance and rights conscious lawyers are unwelcome, would produce the additional benefit of
retarding doctrinal expansion in sensitive areas like divorce and products
liability. No litigation. No new precedent. No expansion of doctrine. At
55
least not through litigation.
I stop here-struck by the similarity between our fanciful plot and the
current campaign against lawyers, litigants, and the formal legal system.
While I cannot and do not wish to deny the formal legal system's
problems, I wonder whether the current critical discourse on the system's
shortcomings has insidious as well as altruistic underpinnings. Could this
discourse be shaped by elites who want to encourage lawyers and disputants to behave in ways that compromise further the interests of those who
have yet to achieve equality? Perhaps our legal system does have significant, yet unacknowledged, difficulties. As Professor Ely notes:
Malfunction occurs when the process is underserving of trust,
when (1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change
to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out .... 56

54. SeeRudolphJ. Gerber, Recommendation on Domestic RelationsReform, 32 ARIz. L. REv. 9,
10 (1990) (stating that matrimonial actions comprise over half of the cases filed in trial
courts); see also David M. Trubek, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. Rv. 72, 87
(1983) (reporting on research showing post-divorce disputes as 59% of all litigation).
55. The covert nature of mediation also restricts public knowledge of substantive results.
Thus the public outrage in response to grossly unfair results that sometimes fuels reform
largely is lacking in divorce mediation.
56. JoHN H. ELY, DFmocAcy AND DisRUsr 103 (1980).

